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Selfishness of preferences alone will not support the coordination necessary for the industrialization
of the food system. Social capital relationships of mutual sympathy (caring) yield socio-emotional
goods that are important in the more personal business world of evolving incomplete contracts and
alliances involving input suppliers, processors, and labor. Relationships are also critical when con-
sumers are buying image as well as physical products. Management and policy alternatives constitute
investment in social capital that can affect opportunism, risk, loyalty, and trust.
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The industrialization process in agriculture, including
consolidation and vertical coordination within the
food system, strongly relies on relationships among
the transacting parties. This emphasis on relation-
ships calls for an enriched conceptual framework
for economic analysis that goes well beyond neo-
classical economics. It also goes beyond organiza-
tional economics, or the new institutional economics,
which is based heavily on selfish preferences, in-
centives, information, and transaction costs, and is
manifested in principal-agent relationships, transac-
tion costs economics, property rights, and incomplete
contracting.
The economics of relationships extends into the
domain of trust and social capital (Fukuyama, 1995).
Our premise is that this enrichment must be an
inherent part of the analytical framework used to
analyze the economic implications of the industrial-
ization of agriculture. While assuming selfish pref-
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erences independent of others may simplify our
models, the evidence supports the conclusion that
relationships matter. Indeed, relationships matter to
the extent that we seek to build and maintain them,
sometimes at significant sacrifices of financial and
material goods.
The reason relationships matter and produce
nontraditional economic behavior is simple. Rela-
tionships of mutual sympathy yield highly valued
socio-emotional goods. To continue to receive these
valued goods, we invest in relationships. Moreover,
the industrialization of agriculture is not likely to be
completely understood without including in the
analysis the production and consumption of socio-
emotional goods and investments in sympathetic
relationships.
The Problem Setting
The industrialization of agriculture today is marked
by new modes of coordination of people and
activities. For much of its history, agriculture was
organized by auction markets. The main signal to
coordinate activity was price, and the parties to the
transaction need not be known to each other. This
was the context for Adam Smith’s celebrated notion
that parties did not have to care for each other to be
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guided by the invisible hand. The commodity spoke
for itself and buyer beware.
Farmers produced and brought the commodity to
a place where other sellers and buyers assembled,
and prices adjusted to clear the market. If the market
did not clear at a price that covered the cost of pro-
duction, producers took this into account in produc-
tion plans for the next period and hoped the same
mistake would not be repeated. Unfortunately, the
same mistake was often repeated because agricul-
ture was marked by endless cycles of under- and
over-supply, and boom and bust as a function of
weather and the aggregate guesses of all producers.
It is not just that the future is uncertain for a firm;
the future does not exist until other firms and con-
sumers act.
The auction market concept in agriculture is
quickly being displaced as the exemplar for agri-
culture. Increasingly, contracts between farmers and
processors specify price, cultural practices, and
product characteristics. The parties to the transac-
tion are known to each other. The processor is also
changing and growing in size and number of func-
tions. Transactions previously coordinated by market
prices are now coordinated by orders to people who
are employees or by provisions in contracts and not
independent contractors. The integrator typically
does not negotiate, but offers the same contract to
all producers. But, its application may involve
interpretation between an individual producer
and the integrator’s agent-monitor. So whether
between or within firms, the human relationships
are more personal than in auction markets. There
is more talk.
Contracts have their limits and are inescapably
incomplete. This is true of the employment contract,
the contract for the delivery of goods, and financial
contracts. If the employer knew exactly what the
employee was to do, there would be little advan-
tage to decentralization. Labor grievance pro-
cedures illustrate the contract cannot be fully
specified. It is an ongoing evolutionary relation-
ship, as is the delivery of goods by an outside sup-
plier of inputs.
In an uncertain and changing world, the contract
is necessarily incomplete and specifics have to be
worked out over time in a continuing relationship.
In fact, most businesses do not attempt to enforce
the letter of a contract even if it ostensibly covers
the matter at issue. One reason is that contracts are
costly to enforce. Another reason is that a literal
interpretation which works a great hardship on one
of the parties would destroy the ongoing rela-
tionship. Willing and enthusiastic participation of
employees and suppliers is essential to modern
business. Begrudged participation leads to poor
quality.
This is not to say contracts have not evolved to
provide incentives for better aligning the interests of
farmer and processor—for example, in hog feeding
(Hennessy and Lawrence, 1999). Contracts can pro-
vide for payment to the farmer based on feed effi-
ciency (Martin, 1997). But still, no matter how
detailed, evolving conflicts must be worked out. In
that context, a threshold of trust based on a pro-
jection of past performances is helpful, but usually
may not be enough to maintain long-term relation-
ships.
The history of the adoption of technology to
achieve high-quality frozen food illustrates the
coordination problems of the modern food system.
Clarence Birdseye invented a flash freezing tech-
nology which greatly improved the quality of frozen
foods. Still, it took many years for the food system
to adopt it. The processors had to adopt the technol-
ogy, the retail stores had to install display freezers,
and consumers had to adjust. It is similar to the
problem today of moving to high-definition televi-
sion and combining the cameras with the receivers.
No supplier of a part of the system can make money
unless all other parts of the system develop simul-
taneously. Short of one firm buying a lot of retail
stores and the freezing plant, a considerable number
of independent investments are necessary. If adop-
tion time is to be shortened, it will require new
ways for firms to develop a shared vision and have
confidence their piece of the system will fit the rest.
Boulding (1973) noted the parties to a transaction
seldom remain at the neutral point on the continuum
from malevolence to benevolence. The parties either
begin to like or dislike each other a little (or a lot,
leading to breakdown). Trust based on reputation
and respect is important, but sympathy and caring
go further. Persons or firms might be tempted to
skimp on performance if it could not be detected
and not harm their reputation, but they might not do
so if they care for the other party.
Sympathy makes it easier for the parties to work
out the inevitable new tensions certain to develop
over time. As production evolves to utilize more
specific assets with risk concentrated on fewer
parties, it is not cheap for either party to cease the
relationship and find a substitute where the
specialized pieces fit together as well as formerly
(Williamson, 1985). If both parties are to be willing
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their mutual expectations over time. It will certainly
help if they have sympathy for each other and /or at
least no malevolence. Emotional goods are derived
from sympathy, and add value and alter the flow
and level of other physical activities.
Socio-Emotional Goods and Social Capital
Sympathy and socio-emotional goods will be essen-
tial in the further industrialization of agriculture
because: (a) industrialization activities will involve
the production and exchange of both material and
socio-emotional goods; and (b) socio-emotional and
material goods are most often commingled, pre-
venting their separate analysis even though we
report our business activities only in terms of mate-
rial and financial units, as though these were the
only things exchanged.
The study of the economics of relationships and
socio-emotional goods requires an effective exten-
sion of the conventional framework of rational
choice theory. This is accomplished by generalizing
the set of goods considered to include socio-emo-
tional goods and by including a new form of capital
capable of producing socio-emotional goods, namely
social capital.
1
Including Social Capital in Economics
For social capital to occupy a place in the pantheon
of other capital forms, it must satisfy the following.
First, it must have capital-like properties. Second, it
must be measurable so that theorists and practi-
tioners can deduce, test, and apply the concept.
Third, there must be reliable ways to invest/dis-
invest in social capital so it can be altered.
Fourth, it must be demonstrated that changes in
social capital alter significantly the terms and
levels of trade. And finally, it must lead to pre-
scriptions which allow policy makers to employ
it to solve important problems, including those
relating to the industrialization of agriculture. If
social capital is ignored in our analysis, our pre-
dictions will be biased and lead us to support false
conclusions.
In what follows, the concept of social capital is
characterized according to the five requirements
described above.
Is Social Capital Really Capital?
What is social capital? Robison, Schmid, and Siles
(forthcoming) define social capital as “a person’s or
group’s sympathy toward another person or group
that may produce a potential benefit, advantage, and
preferential treatment for another person or group
beyond that expected in an exchange relationship.”
Sympathy, affinity, and caring are used synony-
mously. There is substantial cross-cultural evidence
to show individuals are not entirely self-centered
(Henrich et al., 2001). There are, of course, other
social capital definitions.
2 Perhaps one reason so
many definitions of social capital have been pro-
posed is that scientists have not taken the capi-
tal metaphor seriously. Any definition of social
capital should define a concept with capital-like
properties.
What are social capital’s capital-like properties?
Capital is a commodity capable of producing other
goods and services. Capital represents foregone
consumption made in favor of future benefits.
Capital can be used to transform inputs to outputs
including other forms of capital, to supply services
without losing its identity, and to complement and/
or substitute for other forms of capital. Capital is
also capable of decay and maintenance and some
aspects can be alienated.
Social capital as defined here has all of the above
properties. Producers and marketers frequently solve
vexing material problems by calling on their friends
for assistance extracting services from their social
capital to create other capital forms. One’s circle of
friends changes over time. Yet, there is a remark-
able stability in our networks of persons with whom
we enjoy symmetric levels of sympathy. However,
these relationships require regular investments of
socio-emotional goods, i.e., inputs of capital to make
capital.
Sympathy-affinity has the capital-like character
of being subject to investment, while changing a
moral code or norm is difficult. Social capital can
substitute for a variety of other capital forms
including financial and human capital. Social
capital’s ability to internalize externalities among
social capital-rich networks reduces transaction
costs and increases the opportunity for mutually
beneficial agreements. Finally, one can use his
or her social capital to benefit others, such as
when one recommends a friend for a job. What
distinguishes social capital from other forms of
1  Some economists, including Arrow (1999) and Solow (1999), believe
social capital is not an appropriate extension of rational choice theory. We
disagree.
2  For a recent summary, see Woolcock (1998).18   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
capital is that it exists in relationships, not in physi-
cal capital goods.
What are the goods produced by social capital?
Social capital represents an important capital source
because it can be used to produce important socio-
emotional goods. Maslow (1962) and others popu-
larized the idea that we have socio-emotional needs
as well as physical needs. Socio-emotional goods
which satisfy important emotional needs include
meaningful work assignments and expressions
serving to validate one’s usefulness and importance;
experiences of caring that demonstrate one’s well-
being is internalized by important others; and
information flows communicating encourage-
ment, support, and acceptance. Customers want
sellers to care and go beyond the letter of the law
or contract. One important characteristic of socio-
emotional goods is that they must be obtained
from others, including one’s ideal self, at least until
one has reached the stage in life when one’s ideal
self has solidified.
Our need for socio-emotional goods provides an
important incentive for investing in and maintaining
one’s social capital or the social capital of the firm.
Our need for socio-emotional goods also changes
the meaning of work, consumption, and customer
satisfaction. Although under-emphasized in eco-
nomics, work is a consumption good. It is valued in
itself. While economics pays most attention to the
leisure/work tradeoff, job satisfaction—a socio-
emotional good—is becoming increasingly impor-
tant in industrial agriculture. Firms must recognize
that payments to employees and suppliers include
financial incentives and socio-emotional goods.
Firms must also recognize that customers seek to
purchase from the agricultural industrial process
socio-emotional as well as physical goods and
services.
Consider the following. Any firm concerned only
with paying attention to hourly wages and hours
will have high turnover and a begrudging work
force. The same can be said for suppliers. Suppliers
who are ill-treated will look for ways to cheat and
skimp on quality even with the cleverest incentive
contract. Their energy and creativity will go into
cheating the “enemy” rather than into doing a good
job. Providing workers and suppliers socio-emo-
tional goods which often cost little when measured
by financial expenditures can lead to their increased
attentiveness to the well-being of the firm.
Food consumers are increasingly consuming an
image embedded with socio-emotional goods as
much as a physical product. They care how the
good was produced, how the animals and workers
were treated. Remember the international trade
dispute with Mexico over dolphin-safe tuna? Con-
sumers respond to sellers and producers of goods
who treat them with respect and dignity.
As people become richer, they can spend more on
context and image. Producers of genetically modi-
fied organisms (GMOs) are learning this lesson the
hard way. Many people, especially in Europe, do
not trust the assertion of industry or government
that GMOs are safe. They do not believe industry
cares about their welfare. Are consumers regarded
just as mouths with wallets? Universities once seen
as impartial sources of information are increasingly
seen as in the employ of large corporations.
The concept of goodwill and loyalty will become
even more important with industrial agriculture.
Any firm will make mistakes from time to time and
will depend on consumer loyalty to give it time to
make changes (Hirschman, 1970). Simply arguing
that what you are doing provides cheap food will
not impress the contemporary consumer.
Investing/Disinvesting in Social Capital
Social capital is created when the following two
conditions exist: (a) there is an exchange of both
socio-emotional and perhaps material goods and
material goods; and (b) the exchange creates a
surplus in which the combined cost of emotional
and material goods and services provided is less
than the combined value of emotional and material
goods received. If the exchange only involves
material goods and services as typically portrayed
in economic models, then material capital, but not
social capital, is created.
One of the important issues in the social capital
literature is identifying specific ways to invest in
social capital. For example, agribusiness researchers
may find convincing evidence to show social capital
facilitates employee and customer goodwill. But
this knowledge may not be useful unless business
(these same experts) can actually invest/disinvest in
social capital. We suggest several ways to invest in
social capital.
P Identify shared kernels. Socio-emotional goods
are often exchanged when individuals identify
shared kernels. Initial conversations between
strangers often begin by exploring areas when
shared kernels might exist. Same for the business
lunch. This search looks for joint acquaintances,
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same place, attended the same school, or read the
same book. This search might also look for
shared political, cultural, and religious views.
Sometimes this search for shared kernels is
facilitated by creating opportunities to visually
identify shared traits. One’s gender, age, and
dress often communicate one’s kernels. Or,
merely attending a group meeting where mem-
bers share certain traits allows one to identify
others with traits similar to one’s own, e.g.,
attending a church service while on vacation
or traveling. Identifying a shared kernel is a
means of validating and reinforcing one’s own
kernel and that of others.
P Offer ownership. Managers, leaders, and decision
makers in public and private organizations with
resources may extend socio-emotional and tan-
gible goods to their workers, associates, and other
stake holders by providing them opportunities
and responsibility to manage and make decisions
related to the use of their resource. Managers
who share responsibility communicate validation
messages to those empowered that they are cap-
able and responsible and respected.
P Recognize worthy efforts. All successful organi-
zations establish methods for validating approved
efforts. Sometimes these efforts are recognized
by material rewards such as pay increases. Some-
times these efforts are recognized with formal
awards, improved office space, or access to re-
served parking or the executive dining room.
Sometimes these efforts are acknowledged by
informal validation that may include a personal
message of recognition.
P Create shared kernels. Sometimes sympathetic
relationships are created. For example, individuals
may participate in a company team with a shared
objective. Their shared experience becomes a
shared kernel leading to relationships of affinity/
sympathy and social capital. Sometimes this
method of building social capital is referred to as
team building. Teams may be organized around
athletic contests, community investments, politi-
cal objectives, support for schools, opposition to
externalities, etc.
P Give gifts. Perhaps the most popular method of
building social capital is giving gifts. However,
for this method to be successful, there must be no
strings attached and the gift must be personalized
and perceived as something extra if it is to
produce a socio-emotional good in the eyes of
the recipient. For example, a gift from the cor-
poration delivered according to some formula
does not have the same emotional goods attached
as a gift from a husband to his wife remembering
their special day. Similarly, flowers from the
company fail to convey emotional goods of
caring and support in the same way as flowers
sent by individual members of the company.
The business lunch and the corporate box at
the stadium are common gifts, as are premiums
given to customers.
P Create institutions and organizations. Institutions
are rules for ordering human relationships.
Organizations are systems of relationships for
coordinating individual actions according to
some decision rules accepted by the members.
Little can be done cooperatively without institu-
tions. Ownership of opportunities is antecedent
to the market. Each new relationship requires that
partners in the relationship agree on institutions
to order their exchanges. An ability to create and
sustain these institutions communicates shared
values and norms and desires to maintain the
relationship. A person has rights when others
acknowledge the person as a subject, not an
object. This acknowledgment is a kind of socio-
emotional good which reflects a stock of social
capital and can add to that stock. These are
emotional goods and may lead to increased social
capital. The right to form a farmer co-op is an
acknowledgment by society that farmers deserve
help and should be exempt from anti-trust law.
Urban voters may be motivated by some sym-
pathy for farmers and, depending on the feed-
back from farmers, the stock of social capital
held by urbanites for farmers may grow or
deteriorate.
P Communicate socio-emotional goods as well as
tangible rewards. It is a strange phenomenon that
goods with such potentially high returns are so
infrequently provided. The cost of socio-emotion-
al goods is often very small, at least as measured
in units of physical goods. These socio-emotional
goods often are nothing more than a greeting, a
thank you note, a congratulatory note, or a note
of sympathy. However, organizations demon-
strated to function well are those whose members
regularly, and almost without being reminded to
do so, directly exchange socio-emotional goods.20   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
P Resolve conflicts. Transactions often produce
conflicts in values and in understanding what the
facts are. Successfully resolving these conflicts
communicates that the relationship (and social
capital) is valued more than the object of the con-
flict. This statement conveyed through successful
conflict resolution almost always results in in-
creased social capital.
If there are ways to invest in social capital, it
follows there are ways to disinvest. One of the
important ways to destroy social capital is by
creating activities in which the success of one party
requires the failure of another. In financial markets,
it has been demonstrated that increased competition
erodes lender-borrower relationships, and reduces
the capacity (i.e., flexibility) of relationship-based
lenders to render short-term concessions in interest
rates and credit availability to young borrowers or
temporarily troubled borrowers, while making up
the foregone short-term profits over the longer term.
Social capital can also be destroyed by exchanging
negatively valued emotional goods, including ex-
pressions of disrespect and antipathy. Finally, social
capital can be destroyed by opportunistic behavior,
i.e., extracting services without reciprocity or main-
tenance.
Can Social Capital Be Measured?
If motive and preferences are to be considered as
variable, researchers will be (a) conducting more
surveys asking of motive (as well as observing
choices), (b) constructing convincing observable
proxies for the underlying motives (called “construct
validity” in evaluation research), and (c) setting up
experimental controls which can distinguish among
motives. These measures are discussed in detail
below.
Conducting More Surveys to Measure Motive
Surveys can measure the mix of motives prevalent
in various settings (Schmid, forthcoming). People
can be asked why they give preferential treatment.
Researchers have always been suspicious of what
people say, but it tells us more than the selfish
assumptions we now use in our models. There is a
certain arrogance in assuming people’s motives.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue, “These
doubts are, however, based on a priori skepticism
rather than on evidence” (p. 67). In spite of cogni-
tive difficulties, Bertrand and Mullainathan found
the addition of attitude variables predicted income
better than only objective variables.
Economists have learned to utilize data from the
biological sciences, and we can learn to understand
motive from the psychologists. We must remind
ourselves that the measurement of physical capital
is also problematic, which is part of the problem of
modeling aggregate production functions. We do
not have perfect measures of the stock of capital
when its composition and quality change over time,
but we make do.
Constructing Observable Proxies for 
Underlying Motives
Observable proxies for the underlying motives can
sometimes be found which are highly correlated
with the influence of the underlying motive. For
example, people can be asked if their reservation
price for a used car would vary with the identity of
the buyer. In Robison and Schmid (1989), the buyer
categories were family member, friendly neighbor,
stranger, and nasty neighbor. It seems plausible that
in general this represents a continuum of sympathy
and affinity, even if some family members hate each
other.
Another example of the use of proxies for motives
is found in farmland sales (Siles et al., 1999). Farm-
land owners and operators located in Michigan,
Illinois, and Nebraska on average reported they
discount their minimum sell price by as much as 6%
to friendly neighbors and 7% to friendly relatives.
On the other hand, they add an 18% premium when
the buyer is considered unfriendly. Premiums for
unfriendly persons and discounts for friends and
family members suggest levels of trade will be
higher when emotional goods are included in the
exchange. The inference is supported by the reported
sales. Thirty-nine percent of the land sales were to
friendly neighbors, 29% to relatives, 11% to legal
entities, 7% to strangers, and only 2% to unfriendly
neighbors.
Setting Up Experimental Controls to 
Distinguish Among Motives
Selected products (outputs) can be persuasive indi-
rect evidence of the existence of different motives
in the presence of strong theory and experimental
control. This approach supports the existence of
social capital.
Theories mostly begin with a theoretical state-
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those necessary and sufficient conditions required
for the occurrence of B, which can be measured and
observed. A strong theory is one in which few if
any other conditions besides A could produce B. As
a result, if B is observed, we are confident it was
produced by A.
An example of a strong theory was Mendel’s
genetic theory that predicted 1/16th of the plants
would be long-stemmed pea plants if a certain
crossing occurred. Few if any other theories could
have made such a prediction, and observing the pre-
dicted outcome supported the theory even though
the genes producing the outcomes were not observed.
For a social capital example, an anonymous gift is
hard to explain with a selfish motive. The opportun-
ity for self-advancement (selfish motive) is controlled
by the context.
Both selfish and sympathetic motives are a pro-
duct of the self. It adds little to say that some people
have a selfish preference for giving. Assuming
selfish motives and preferences to the exclusion of
sympathetic motives limits our research and isolates
us from other social sciences. We will never develop
direct or indirect measures of social capital if our
theory assumes it away.
Missing from most of neoclassical economics
is a theory which includes social capital, and
therefore these theories cannot be used to measure
or test for it. We, along with other colleagues, have
attempted to develop and test theories for predicting
outcomes from variations in social capital that
would be difficult to predict from other theories
(Robison, Myers, and Siles, forthcoming). These
efforts to measure social capital, directly and indi-
rectly, will continue.
Does Social Capital Make a Difference? 
Can the Difference Be Measured?
Social capital and the exchange of socio-emotional
goods not only alter market outcomes, but almost
every other outcome involving personal exchanges.
One approach begins by establishing a standard
outcome, then altering the level of social capital
involved in the exchange, and then measuring the
difference in outcome. The procedure is similar to
the method used to measure risk aversion as a
pattern. Respondents are provided with a gamble
and then asked for a certain outcome for which they
would exchange the gamble and be just as well off
as they were owning the gamble. The difference
between the mean outcome and the certainty
equivalent is called a risk premium and is generally
accepted as a measure of the respondent’s risk
aversion.
We adopt a similar strategy when measuring
social capital premiums. We establish a minimum
sell price in an arms-length relationship. Then we
face the seller (buyer) with buyers (sellers) for
whom he or she holds social capital (e.g., has affin-
ity or sympathy for) as measured in the previous
section of this paper, and find the new minimum
sell price. The difference is the premium associated
with the emotional goods produced by one’s social
capital held for others. Such methods have been
used to measure the role of social capital in such
diverse exchanges as the sale of used cars, proba-
bility of loan approval, tipping behavior, willingness
to cooperate, customer retention, and minimum sell
prices for land.
3
Another example of social capital altering market
outcomes is when food advertisers search for ways
to attach socio-emotional goods to their messages to
improve the sale of their products. Sometimes these
methods of product sales involve well-known
athletes and public personalities to promote their
products. Consumption of these goods confers
status.
Business relies on trust when contract is incom-
plete and costly to maintain (Wilson and Kennedy,
1999). Trust can simply be a projection from past
experience. But this does not protect against oppor-
tunism when it cannot be detected and thus would
not damage trust.
Kumar (1996) reports a deeper and more depend-
able trust is possible when the parties “believe that
each is interested in the other’s welfare and neither
will act without first considering the action’s impact
on the other” (p. 95). From Kumar’s study, surveys
of suppliers and retailers indicate the deeper variety
of trust results in less searching for alternative
partners, more commitment to the supplier, more
sales of the supplier’s products, and better per-
formance ratings. (See also Peterson, Robison,
and Siles, 1999).
Reference has already been made above to the
effect of social capital on farmland sales prices. For
other examples, see Schmid and Robison (1995). It
should be noted that social capital may be a neces-
sary condition for preferential treatment, but if the
treatment involves physical resources, it is contin-
gent on the social capitalist having some physical
capital to transfer.
3  See Robison and Schmid (1989); Siles, Robison, and Hanson (1994);
Hanson, Robison, and Siles (1996); and Robison and Hanson (1995).22   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Management and Policy Alternatives 
Involving Social Capital
The current characterization of the “industrial-
ization of agriculture” largely refers to different
varieties of coordination and increases in consol-
idation in the food system. Consolidation pertains to
merger and size issues both within and across the
stages of the food system. Changing coordination
refers to the increasing displacement of open, spot
markets between the stages of the food system by a
variety of institutions ranging over market contracts,
contract production, and vertical integration, and
called by a host of names (e.g., alliances, joint ven-
tures, consortia, networks, franchising, etc.).
Dairy production, seed, commercial fruits and
vegetables, turkeys, eggs, and broilers have long
experienced some form of vertical coordination. For
pork, consolidation and contract production has
grown rapidly to probably approach 40S50% of total
production, in some form or other. Greater coordin-
ation is occurring in crop production as well.
Some Latin American cities are witnessing a
revolution in food retailing (Reardon and Berdegue,
2000). The traditional farmer markets in cities are
losing out to chain stores. These stores are making
contracts with farmers to provide high-quality fruits
and vegetables not typically found in community
markets. The chains are requiring the highest stand-
ards of sanitation be followed—a demand for heavy
investment most small-scale farmers cannot meet.
This stipulation is reminiscent of the sanitation
requirements in Grade A milk production that drove
U.S. small farmers out of the business.
However, making a contract (or even if the chain
owns the processing plant and the workers are
employees) does not ensure the sanitation rules are
followed. The employee fills out the form stating
hands were washed, but monitoring is another thing.
One only needs to note that theft by employees is
greater in retailing than theft by customers. Unhappy
employees and contractees performing begrudged
work will be opportunistic. While the chains’ fruits
may look nice, and they may displace small owner-
operator and co-op farmers, there is still no guarantee
the produce is free of pesticides and contamination
if not easily detected.
The former cooperative of small farmers may
have had a lot of social capital among its members.
Yet this will not protect them from competition by
the integrating chains if they do not have the capital
to respond. But that does not suggest social capital
is irrelevant; it just takes different forms. No matter
how industrial, a food system still contains face-to-
face transactions between employer and employee,
food processor marketing representative and store
buyer, and between the store and its customers.
Social capital is a factor in all of these transactions.
Consolidation and coordination are not neces-
sarily new developments. Mighell, Jones, and
Briemyer were historic leaders in identifying and
analyzing these structural issues. In recent times,
however, renewed emphasis has been given to coor-
dination and consolidation, with some major changes
in motivation and direction for the organization of
the agricultural sector.
Higher levels of coordination are motivated by
the combined effects of several factors: (a) changes
in consumer preferences related to the cost, safety,
convenience, and nutritional attributes of food and
fiber products; (b) needs for better coordination
than was provided by spot markets and conven-
tional pricing for transmitting information about
these preferences through the stages of the food
system; (c) avoidance of opportunistic hold-up prob-
lems in transactions involving highly specific assets;
(d) reductions in and reallocations of risks, with
some risks being reduced by consolidation and
coordination, and others (especially contractual per-
formance) increasing in importance; (e) efficiency
and size economies that help to drive the perfor-
mance of entities throughout the food system; and
(f) technological change to better tailor production
to changes in consumer preferences and to enhance
productivity (e.g., genetic, health, measurement sys-
tems, packaging and transport, etc.).
The irony is that such coordination developments
tend to involve movements away from the pure spot
market-driven concepts of economic competition,
with replacement by the various contractual arrange-
ments which depend heavily on the integrity of the
transaction parties, building of trust, creation of
effective incentive systems, sharing of information,
monitoring and enforcement arrangements, and
other factors.
Some have argued development depends on
moving away from relationship-dependent out-
comes. But in an environment where fewer and
fewer firms are absorbing increasingly high levels
of risk, it may be that increasing dependence on
social capital is an appropriate response to risk. In
this regard, one of the authors recalls an interview
with a rice producer and miller in Ecuador who
declared expansion of his enterprise was limited
because he lacked relatives to include in the busi-
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As the industrialization of agriculture proceeds,
relationships will become more important. Relation-
ships of trust and sympathy will provide the confi-
dence to engage in complicated transactions, some-
times on the basis of a phone call or a handshake.
Relationships of sympathy and trust will substitute
for enforcement procedures that would slow the
process of exchange and raise the cost of doing
business. Relationships of sympathy and trust will
also internalize the external consequences of one’s
choices, and thus decisions can come closer to bene-
fitting all members of the social capital-connected
network. Relationships of sympathy and trust will
also serve to identify who is included in important
industrialization activities.
On the other hand, absent relationships of sym-
pathy and trust, the industrialization process is
stymied. We boycott sugar from Cuba, oil from
Iraq, clothing produced under oppressive working
conditions, and sometimes show contempt for those
wearing animal fur coats—not because it is in our
material interest to do so, but because of the negative
emotional goods such economic consumption activi-
ties would require.
Social capital can be used for good or ill, as is
true for most varieties of capital. Sympathetic rela-
tionships that internalize the well-being of others
produce beneficial consequences such as reduced
transaction costs and opportunistic behavior. But
these same sympathetic relationships among network
members may lead to exclusions and discrimination
against others. Europe’s sympathy for its former col-
onies results in discrimination against bananas from
Latin America. Laws that restrict nepotism, demand
arms-length relationships and legal proceedings,
anonymity, and other institutions are vivid reminders
of the down side possibility of social capital. As
relationships become more important in agriculture,
we may also need to consider if existing safeguards
for consumers and competitors are adequate.
Eating Alone
Food has historically been the focus of sociability.
One shows social capital for others and invests in its
further development by giving food to family and
friends. The shared kernel of eating together seems
to be deteriorating. Robert Putnam (2000) coined
the clever metaphor of “bowling alone” to illustrate
the trend in social interaction. Once we bowled in
leagues and now more people bowl as individuals.
The same is happening with food. Members of
families who once ate together now catch a bite and
run off to their favorite activity. There is a preva-
lence of restaurants with television and loud music,
relieving people from the intimacy of having to talk
to each other.
Status is a socio-emotional good (Frank, 1987).
Food is losing its place as a status good. Some food
products constitute conspicuous consumption and
convey to one’s guests that you are of high status or
that you regard them highly. We can serve an ex-
pensive foreign beer to impress our guests, but milk
cannot impress. Agricultural products are losing
out, and even the milk moustache on famous people
seems inadequate to stem the tide. We have ex-
plained the income and price inelasticity of food
products by the limited size of the stomach, but
there is no physical limit to the demand for prestige
and the giving of regard. Eating alone is a loss for
social capital in general and the economics of the
food system in particular.
Summary and Conclusions
Agricultural economists’ contributions to under-
standing and predicting outcomes of the industrial-
ization process will be improved if we include in
our observations and calculations a newly recognized
resource, social capital. Including social capital in
our efforts to explain the industrialization of agri-
culture does not mean we ignore all that has been
learned under the selfishness of preference models.
Indeed, there are a significant number of settings
where the selfishness of preference model still oper-
ates. But we do need to recognize that much of what
goes on in the industrialization process involves
social capital and emotional goods.
Our past should make it easier to face the future
with a paradigm incorporating the importance of
relationships. Agricultural economists have recog-
nized that relationships matter. Our early and close
associations with our sister social sciences, especi-
ally rural sociology, recognized that relationships
mattered. It was assumed our close association with
those who studied relationships, even combining
them in the same department, would shed light on
how economics is performed. We accepted the need
for regular reminders to account for the importance
of relationships in or outside of lonely crowds.
Agricultural economists have been reminded of
the importance of relationships by the writings of
the venerable Adam Smith. He emphasized not only
the selfish motivation of the baker, but also that
economic progress depends on our shared feelings
of sympathy which internalize externalities and lead24   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
us to form and keep rules designed to order our
relationships. In his treatise, The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, Smith wrote:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest
him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it,
except the pleasure of seeing it.
The industrialization of agriculture is a process
that will require new models to analyze and under-
stand the new ways of doing business. The auction
models of the past may be less relevant than a
model incorporating personal interactions and the
exchange of emotional as well as physical goods
and services. What we expect to be learned from
models which include an expanded set of goods is
that social capital is an essential resource for main-
taining willing participation over time and realizing
human potential. This means the parties need to
invest in creating and maintaining affinity, just as in
any asset. It can’t be taken for granted.
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